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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CONTRIBUTION AMONG JOINT TORT-FEASORS.-In the recent
case of the Royal Indemnity Co. v. Becker et al.,1 John Webber
obtained a judgment against David Gordon, John Becker and
F. Becker for injuries sustained by him as the result of their
joint and concurrent negligence. At this time, David Gordon
was indemnified against loss of the above character by reason
of a policy issued by the Royal Indemnity Company. This
company paid the full amount of the judgment to Webber, took
an assignment of the judgment, recorded the assignment, and
had execution levy against real property owned by the Beckers.
Suit was brought to procure an order to sell the realty and
enforce the judgment against it. The Beckers thereupon brought
this suit to restrain the sale of the realty and the enforcement
of the judgment against them, upon the ground that the judg-
ment had been fully satisfied by the payment by the Royal
Indemnity Company. The court issued a permanent injunction
holding: First, that the satisfaction of a judgment against one
1 122 Ohio St. 582.
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joint tort-feasor releases all therefrom, because there is no right
of contribution between persons whose concurrent negligence
has made them liable in damages; and second, that where an
indemnitor of a joint tort-feasor fully pays and satisfies a judg-
ment obtained against its indemnitee and another for damages
resulting from their concurrent negligence, such indemnitor has
no greater right than the indemnitee, and though upon payment
it obtains an assignment of the judgment, it may not enforce
payment of the whole or any part thereof from the co-defendant
of the indemnitee.
It can readily be seen that this case presents the following
questions: First, is there a right of contribution between joint
tort-feasors whose joint or concurrent negligence resulted in a
joint liability for damages? Second, has the indemnitor who
pays the judgment any greater right in that respect than the
joint tort-feasor who was indemnified, and may the indemnity
company upon paying the judgment and procuring an assign-
ment thereof, enforce payment in whole or in part from the
unindemnified tort-feasor ?
A reduction of the circumstances of the first question into
the simplest elements will aid in arriving at the true answer
to the question. These elements are: First, two or more persons
have united in perpetrating a legal wrong upon some third
person; second, the third person legally recovers damages from
one of the parties committing the tort; and third, the tort-feasor
who has been compelled to pay all the damages then seeks to
charge his joint tort-feasor with an obligation, or liability, to
the extent of a proportionate part of the damages the former
has been compelled to pay because of their joint tort. The first
question is then reduced to the proposition of whether or not
the tort-feasor seeking this remedy has any right of action.
It is apparent that any right of action the tort-feasor might
possibly have must be predicated upon his own wrong. To allow
a person who has committed a wrong to set up his wrongdoing
and recover therefor, merely because someone else joined with
him in perpetrating the wrong, would create an anomalous con-
dition-especially so, if one bears in mind that laws and courts
of justice are created to redress and suppress the commission
of wrongful acts. It would require an extraordinarily specious
argument to explain how the fact that another has joined in
the commission of the tort makes it any the less a recognized
legal wrong.
The first question must be answered in the negative. The
general principle, supported by the great weight of authority,
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and recognized in law and equity,2 is that there is no right of
contribution between joint tort-feasors whose joint or concurrent
acts or omissions resulted in a joint liability for damages, even
though one of the joint tort-feasors has been compelled to pay
all the damages for the wrong done.3 In order to obtain a
clearer conception of the application of the general principle,
there are presented here the following short summaries of a
few cases wherein the general principle is applied.
As a result of the concurrent negligence of an interurban
railroad and one Beskin, who was driving an automobile across
the track of the railroad, the passengers in Beskin's car were
injured. The passengers recovered a judgment against the rail-
road. The railroad company thereupon brought an action for
contribution against Beskin. The court held that contribution
between the interurban railroad and the automobile driver,
whose concurrent negligence was the proximate cause of the
tort, could not be compelled.
4
In another case, the plaintiff was injured as a result of the
joint and concurrent negligence of the Chicago Railways Com-
pany, and the Pirola Company. He recovered a joint judgment
against them. Pending an appeal by the railway, it entered
into an agreement with the plaintiff, who covenanted not to
sue nor proceed against the railway. Execution issued against
the Pirola Company, upon the original judgment, and was
returned unsatisfied. The plaintiff then brought this suit in
equity in the nature of a creditor's bill to discover assets, and
apply any found on the judgment. The court held that the
Chicago Railways Company, and the Pirola Company, were
joint tort-feasors and there was no right of contribution be-
tween them.5
In the third case, a railroad company delivered to a terminal
company a car on which the wheel of the brake was improperly
2Dwinelle v. Edey, 102 N. Y. 423; Wanack v. Michels, 215 Ill. 87;
Pennsylvania Co. v. Roberts & Schaefer Co., 250 Ill. App. 330.
3 Wanack v. Michels, 215 Ill. 87; Petroyeanis v. Pirola, 205 111. App.
310; Sincer v. Bell, 47 La. Ann. 1548; Gale Lumber Co. v. Bush, 227
Mass. 203; Adams v. White Bus Line Co., 184 Cal. 710; Norfolk South-
ern R. Co. v. Beskin, 140 Va. 744; Pennsylvania Co. v. West Penn.
Rys. Co., 110 Ohio St. 516; Detroit, G. H. & M. R. Co. v. Boomer, 194
Mich. 52; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Louisville Bridge Co., 171 Ky. 445;
Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. County Commissioners of Howard County,
113 Md. 404; Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Swift & Co., 23 Ga. App.
346; Fedden v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 199 N. Y. Supp. 9;
Union Stock Yards Co. of Omaha v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 196 U. S.
217.
4 Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Beskin, 140 Va. 744.
5 Petroyeanis v. Pirola, 205 Ill. App. 310.
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attached to the brake staff. The terminal company, without
inspecting the car, placed one of its employees on the car. The
employee was injured as a result of the defective brake and
recovered damages from the terminal company. The terminal
company then brought an action for contribution against the
railroad company. It was held that the negligence of the rail-
road company and the terminal company was of the same char-
acter and degree. Both had joined in the commission of the tort
and there was no right of contribution between them. 6
The general principle, that there is no right of contribution
between joint tort-feasors, is not exclusive since it is confined
to cases where it may reasonably be presumed that the plaintiff
in the action for contribution knew that he was doing a wrongful
act,7 or where the negligence of each of the joint tort-feasors
contributed proximately to the tort.8 The necessary result of
this confinement in the application of the general principle is
found in the development of certain recognized exceptions, or
classes of cases, wherein the general principle is not recognized
or given effect.
The first exception, or class of cases, where the general prin-
ciple is not recognized as being applicable is found in admiralty
law.0 The reason for this is given as being historical. It is very
likely true that the reason for this exception may be traced to
the distinctive liabilities created by maritime law.
The second exception arises when the injury grows out of a
neglect of duty resting primarily upon one of the parties, and,
but for his negligence, there would be no cause of action against
the plaintiff seeking contribution.' 0 The reason for this excep-
tion is apparent when one considers the case of a person who
6 Union Stock Yards Co. of Omaha v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 196
U. S. 217.
7 Armstrong County v. Clarion County, 66 Pa. St. 218; Chicago Rys.
Co. v. R. F. Conway Co., 219 fI1. App. 220; Horrabin v. City of Des
Moines, 198 Iowa 549.
8 Union Stock Yards Co. of Omaha v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 196
U. S. 217.
9 Erie R. Co. v. Erie & W. Transp. Co., 204 U. S. 225.
10 Pennsylvania Co. v. Roberts & Schaefer Co., 250 Ill. App. 330;
Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Macon Ry. & Light Co., 140 Ga. 309;
Eureka Coal Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 219 Ala. 286; Waterbury
v. Waterbury Traction Co., 74 Conn. 152; Lowell v. Boston & Lowell
R. R. Corp., 40 Mass. 24; Horbach's Administrators v. Elder, 18 Pa.
St. 33; Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Latham, 63 Me. 177; Nashua Iron &
Steel Co. v. Worcester & Nashua R. R. Co., 62 N. H. 159; Commercial
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Capital City Surety Co., 231 N. Y. Supp. 494;
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Northwestern Telephone
Exch. Co., 140 Minn. 229; Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of
Columbia, 161 U. S. 316.
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has been compelled to respond in damages to a third person,
because some collateral proposition of law acts upon the relation-
ship between the parties at the time the tort was committed.
This occurs even though the party who has been compelled to
pay did not participate in committing the tort. In this case
the party who has responded in damages does not need to base
his right of action upon any wrongful act of his own. The
right of action for contribution, or indemnity, is based upon
the legal wrong committed by the party against whom the action
is brought.
The three following cases falling within the confines of this
exception will aid in obtaining a better understanding of the
operation of this exception.
The defendant built a sand plant for the plaintiff railroad.
An employee of the railroad was injured as a result of the
defective attachment of a counterweight to the sand plant. The
employee recovered against the railroad for his injuries. There-
upon the railroad brought an action for contribution against
the defendant. The court held that the railroad company and
the contractor were not in pari delicto so as to make applicable
the principle which prevents contribution between joint tort-
feasors, and contribution would be permitted. 1
The defendant operated an electric light company and sup-
plied the plaintiff railway with light. The defendant had exclu-
sive control over the lighting system. One of the plaintiff's
employees was killed, while loading coal, as a result of a short
circuit in the lighting system. The short circuit was caused
by a part of the coal loader rubbing against a defectively insu-
lated wire. Recovery was had against the railway for causing
wrongful death. The plaintiff brought an action for contribu-
tion against the defendant. The court held that the defendant's
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. The plain-
tiff's negligence was not of the same degree or kind as the
defendant's and contribution is permissible.
12
The defendant was a gas company doing business in the Dis-
trict of Columbia. One Marietta Parker was injured because
a gas box in the sidewalk was not covered. She recovered dam-
ages against the District of Columbia even though it was not
shown that the District knew of the absence of the cover. The
District thereupon brought an action for contribution against
the defendant. The court held that a municipality which has
been held liable for an injury sustained as a result of the negli-
"1 Pennsylvania Co. v. Roberts & Schaefer Co., 250 I1. App. 330.
12 Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Macon Ry. & Light Co., 140 Ga. 309.
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gence of another may obtain contribution from the other. The
plaintiff and the defendant were not negligent in the same man-
ner or degree. The negligence of the defendant was the proxi-
mate cause of the tort, and the injury was occasioned by the
failure of the company to perform its legal duty in the first
instance.
13
The third exception to the general principle-that there is
no right of contribution between joint tort-feasors-arises when
the act causing the injury is not a wrong per se, and the plain-
tiff seeking contribution, whether or not he joined in the actual
commission of the act, is not chargeable with knowledge of the
wrongfulness of the act.14 It is possible that this exception has
its source in natural justice, as understood at the present time.
The fact that the tort-feasor must predicate his right of action
for contribution upon his own tort is obscured for the moment.
The necessity of suppressing the commission of wrongful acts is
not felt very strongly in the present instance. The reason for
this is that the tort is not wrongful per se; there was no intent
to commit a tort; it cannot be said that the parties knew they
were committing a tort; and they acted for their mutual benefit
upon what they had reasonable grounds to believe were the true
facts. With these circumstances in mind, it seems reasonable
and just that each of the parties to the tort should bear a
proportionate part of any liability incurred by one of them
because of their joint and concurrent acts.
It will be advantageous, in order to have a better conception
of this exception, to consider a few cases falling within the
operation of the exception.
The plaintiff and the defendant were both creditors of the
same firm. They honestly believed that the debtor firm had
made a fraudulent assignment of its goods to a third party.
While being of this opinion, which was not unjustified under
the circumstances, the creditors sued out writs of attachment
against the said goods. The creditors could not justify the
attachment. Thereafter the plaintiff was compelled to pay the
damages, and brought this action for contribution against the
defendant. The court held that the rule that there can be no
contribution among joint wrongdoers applies only to cases where
there has been an intentional violation of the law, or where the
13 Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U. S. 316.
14 Farwell et al. v. Becker et al., 129 Ill. 261; Chicago Rys. Co. v.
R. F. Conway Co., 219 Ill. App. 220; Horrabin v. City of Des Moines,
198 Iowa 549; Emmons v. Evans, 178 Ky. 180; Vandiver v. Pollak, 97
Ala. 467; Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449; Central Bank & Trust Co. v.
Cohn, 150 Tenn. 375; Armstrong County v. Clarion County, 66 Pa. St.
218; Steinfield v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 79 N. H. 422.
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wrongdoer is presumed to have known that the act was unlaw-
ful. The action for contribution is therefore permissible in this
case. 15
The plaintiff contracted to build a bridge for the defendant,
the city of Des Moines. The defendant agreed to furnish a right
of way and an approach but failed to do so. The result was
that the plaintiff, working under the direction of one of defen-
dant's engineers, trespassed upon private property and was
made to respond in damages even though he actually believed
that the defendant had obtained the right of way. Thereupon,
the plaintiff brought this action for contribution against the
defendant. It was held that the plaintiff could not be charged
with knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act and that an
action for contribution would lie, although both parties joined
in committing the act, since the act was merely mnalum prohib-
itum and in no respect immoral.'l
A. Emmons and Charles Payne honestly believed they had
acquired title-to certain realty by inheritance. The basis for
this belief was the fact that Emmons and Payne were close
heirs of the decedent owner and Emmons occupied the land and
paid taxes on it for fifteen years. Emmons cut timber standing
on the land, sold the timber, and divided the proceeds with
Payne. Thereafter, all parties having an interest in the land
by the law of Kentucky brought an action for waste against
Emmons who filed a cross-petition whereby, among other things,
he sought to enforce contribution from Payne. The court held
that where one of several joint tenants cut timber and divided
the proceeds with another joint tenant, and thereafter was com-
pelled to reimburse his other co-tenants, be could recover from
the co-tenant, with whom he had divided, any excess of the
amount he had paid him over his proportionate share. The
defense that the parties were joint tort-feasors will not be per-
mitted, since the parties to the transaction were under the mis-
taken belief that they owned the land.
17
In a few jurisdictions, notably Wisconsin and Minnesota, the
general principle that there is no right of contribution between
joint tort-feasors, is still further circumscribed in its operation.
These jurisdictions permit contribution between joint tort-
feasors, even where it is shown that both tort-feasors were negli-
gent in the same manner and degree and it would not be unrea-
sonable to presume that they knew they were acting negligently,
if the acts or omissions constituting the tort did not involve
15 Farwell et al. v. Becker et al., 129 Ill. 261.
36 Horrabin v. City of Des Moines, 198 Iowa 549.
17 Emmons v. Evans, 178 Ky. 180.
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moral turpitude.ls It is apparent that these courts disregard
the fact that the tort-feasor must set up his own wrong in
order to recover contribution. The only thing given considera-
tion, apparently, is the proposition that burdens and benefits
common to the parties involved should be equally apportioned
among them. These courts have extended the operation of an
equitable principle without giving much thought to the reasons
for the doctrine of contribution or the limits within which the
doctrine was intended to operate. It would seem that they arc
inclined to dispense natural justice as understood at the present
time and have found that, by considering only the statement
defining contribution, this inclination may be given rein and
justified. A necessary consequence of the proposition advanced
by these courts is that the policy of aiding in the suppression
of wrongful acts, by not permitting anyone to maintain an
action based upon his own wrong, is limited to those wrongful
acts or omissions which involve moral turpitude.
The second question under discussion must be answered in
the negative. As was stated previously this is a question of
whether or not the indemnitor of one joint tort-feasor who pays
the judgment and takes an assignment thereof has any greater
right than his indemnitee to enforce the payment of contribu-
tion from an unindemnified joint tort-feasor.
The indemnitor is interested in the controversy and its atten-
dant results because his indemnitee is involved in the matter.
If the injured party had proceeded against the indemnified joint
tort-feasor, the latter would have been compelled to pay the
whole of the joint judgment. In which event, under the general
principle previously discussed, the indemnified tort-feasor would
have no action for contribution against his fellow tort-feasors.
In the event that the indemnitor paid his indemnitee, the former
would be subrogated to the rights of the latter with the result
that any defense which might have been set up against the
indemnitee in his action for contribution, might be set up against
the indemnitor in his action for contribution.
The fact that the indemnitor pays the judgment, takes an
assignment thereof, and then proceeds against all the tort-feasors
against whom the judgment was rendered, with the exception
of his indemnitee, does not change the relationship of the real
parties to the judgment and assignment thereof. 19 In the final
analysis, the payment and assignment of the judgment is an
1SMitchell v. Raymond, 181 Wis. 591; Mayberry v. Northern Pac.
Ry. Co., 100 Minn. 79.
19Boyer v. Bolender, 129 Pa. St. 324; Adams v. White Bus Line Co.,
184 Cal. 710.
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artifice by which it is attempted to do indirectly, that which
cannot be done directly. The courts recognize the assignment
as an artifice and look to the real nature of the entire transac-
tion and the circumstances out of which it arose.
Since the indemnitor should be considered as being the indem-
nified joint tort-feasor, or substituted in the latter's place, the
indemnitor, who pays a judgment rendered against his indem-
nitee and another as joint tort-feasors and takes an assignment
thereof, may enforce payment of contribution from the unin-
demnified tort-feasor if the indemnitee might have obtained
contribution, 20 but may not enforce payment of contribution if
the indemnitee would not have been able to obtain contribution.
21
LIABILITY OF CARRIER FOR FURNISHING DISEASE-INFECTED CARS
FOR TRANSPORTATION OF CATTLE.-E. P. Slade brought suit
against the St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Company,
22
alleging that he contracted with the defendant to transport cer-
tain hogs and cattle. Among other things, he alleged that the
car furnished by the defendant was infected with cholera and
that by reason thereof certain of his hogs became infected with
it and died. The defendant's demurrer was overruled and ver-
dict was given for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of the state
affirmed the decision.
The evidence tended to prove first, that all the hogs so shipped
were free from cholera or cholera contamination at the time
they were shipped; second, that there was no cholera in the
vicinity from which they came, nor had there been any there
for a number of years prior to the date on which they were
shipped and that after the shipment was made no cholera devel-
oped there; third, there was no cholera in the vicinity of Coun-
cil, the destination, and no cholera had been there for a number
of years prior to the time this shipment arrived and until the
hogs of this shipment died of it. There was no possible way
in which the disease could have been contracted except from the
defendant's cars. There was also some testimony that this car
had contained other hogs and had not been cleaned before the
Slade shipment was made. The conclusion from this was that
the hogs previously shipped in that car were infected, that the
20Steinfield v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 79 N. H. 422;
Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co. of New York v. Northwestern Telephone
Exch. Co., 140 Minn. 229; Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Capital City
Surety Co., 231 N. Y. Supp. 494; Underwriters at Lloyds of Minneapolis
v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388.
21Adams v. White Bus Line Co., 184 Cal. 710; National Surety Co.
v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 19 Fed. (2d) 448.
22 St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Slade, (Okla.) 291 Pac. 107.
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car had not been cleaned and disinfected subsequent to that
date, and that the hogs of this shipment contracted cholera
by contact with the litter and manure from the former shipment,
and the loss complained of occurred.
The rules of common law determining the liability of common
carriers had been established long before the advent of the
railroad. With the development of railroads and the transpor-
tation of live stock, the courts differed in their opinion as to
whether the rules of the common law applicable to the liability
of common carriers also applied to the transportation of live
stock.
According to the early cases, the common carrier of inani-
mate goods is an insurer of the goods against all losses except
those arising from an act of God, the public enemy, an act of
the public authority, an act of the shipper, or the inherent
nature of the goods themselves. Unless the loss be due to one
of these exceptions the carrier cannot excuse himself from lia-
bility by showing that the loss is inevitable, that he is entirely
free from negligence, or that he has exercised the utmost possible
human diligence and foresight. He is absolutely liable. 23
Is the carrier of live stock an insurer? In other words, does
the same liability attach to the carrier of live stock as to the
carrier of inanimate goods? In some states, notably Michigan,
it has been held that those who undertake to transport live stock
are not liable as common carriers, but are only bound to trans-
port with ordinary care and skill. The reason for this rule
lies in the natural propensities of animals which may lead to loss
or damage regardless of the control exercised by those who
undertake their transportation. 24
In the case of Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana Rail-
road Company v. McDonough,2 5 the court said in discussing
the early liability of carriers: "These responsibilities and
duties were fixed with reference to kinds of property involving
in their transportation much fewer risks, and of quite a different
kind from those which are incident to the transportation of live
stock by railroad. . . . It is a mode of transportation which,
but for its necessity, would be gross cruelty, and indictable as
such. The risk may be greatly lessened by care and vigilance,
23 Agnew v. Steamer Contra Costa, 27 Cal. 425; Hill Manufacturing
Co. v. Boston & Lowell R. Co., 104 Mass. 122.
24 Heller v. Chicago & G. T. Ry. Co., 109 Mich. 53; Colorado & S.
Ry. Co. v. Breniman, 2Z Colo. App. 1; Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v.
Hall, 124 Ga. 322; Stiles, Gaddie & Stiles v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 129
Ky. 175.
25 21 Mich. 165.
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by feeding and watering at proper intervals, by getting up those
that are down and otherwise. But this imposes a degree of care
and an amount of labor so different from what is required in
reference to other kinds of property that I do not think this
kind of property falls within the reasons upon which the com-
mon law liability of common carriers are fixed."
However, the clear weight of authority is that the ordinary
liability of a common carrier attaches in the transportation of
live stock; and, on undertaking their transportation, a carrier
assumes the obligation to deliver them safely against all con-
tingencies except such as would excuse the non-delivery of other
property; that is, it is not accountable for loss resulting from
the inherent nature of the property and not due to any negli-
gence or fault on its part.2
6
The rule as established by the United States Supreme Court
in North Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. Commercial Na-
tional Bank,2 7 is quite clear on the subject. "A railroad com-
pany, it is true, is not a carrier of live stock with the same re-
sponsibilities which attend it as a carrier of goods. The nature of
the property, the inherent difficulties of its safe transportation,
and the necessity of furnishing to the animals food and water,
light and air, and protecting them from injuring each other, im-
pose duties in many respects widely different from those devolv-
ing upon a mere carrier of goods. The most scrupulous care in
the performance of his duties will not always secure the carrier
from loss. But notwithstanding this difference in duties and
responsibilities, the railroad company, when it undertakes gen-
erally to carry such freight, becomes subject, under similar
conditions, to the same obligations, so far as the delivery of the
animals which are safely transported is concerned, as in the
case of goods."
The fact that the carriage of live stock was unknown at com-
mon law in nowise affected the question, as the liability of
carriers was fixed by the character of the business, and not by
the character of the goods carried.28  The liability of carriers
of animals is modified only where the damage for which recom-
pense is sought is a consequence of the conduct or propensities
26 Covington Stock Yards Co. v. Keith, 139 U. S. 128; Chicago &
Alton R. Co. v. Erickson, 91 Ill. 613; St. Louis & Southeastern Ry.
Co. v. Dorman, 72 Ill. 504; Chicago & r. & L. R. Co. v. Baugh, 175 Ind.
419; Kimball v. Rutland & Burlington R. Co.. 26 Vt. 247; Evans v.
Fitchburg R. Co., 111 Mass. 142; South & North Alabama R. Co. v.
Henlein & Barr, 52 Ala. 606.
27 123 U. S. 727.
28 Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nichols, 9 Kan. 162.
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of animals undertaken to be carried. In other respects, the
common-law responsibility of the carrier will attach.
29
In an early Illinois case the court said: "The common-law
liability of a carrier to deliver live animals is not different from
that where the delivery of merchandise or other dead matter is
concerned.''30 But this must be impliedly qualified so as to
excuse the carrier if loss occurs because of the inherent nature
or vicious propensities of the animal. While the courts differ
as to whether the carrier of live stock is a common carrier, yet
the difference is of no practical importance, because they arrive
at the same result, freeing the carrier if loss is due to the
inherent nature of the animal. It was stated in Adams Express
Company v. Bratton,31 that it was unimportant whether live-
stock bailments for transport should be considered a further
exception to the carrier's insurance liability where the damage
arises out of the vitality of the animals, or whether it should be
considered merely as a fuller statement of the common-law rule
which, on the question of the insurance liability, took note of
the inherent quality of the freight.
With reference to the Slade case, a disease, such as hog cholera,
contracted in the carrier's cars does not fall under such a classi-
fication as "natural propensities of animals." It appears from
the evidence that the plaintiff's hogs were free from disease
and had the defendant not furnished a disease-infected car no
loss would have resulted.
Is there a duty on the carrier of live stock to furnish a car
free from contagious disease? That a carrier of live stock is
bound to provide cars for transportation that are fit and suitable
under existing conditions, 32 and the failure to discharge that
duty is negligence making a carrier liable for all damages result-
ing therefrom.
33
The reported cases are in harmony in holding that a carrier
which undertakes to transport live stock is liable for damages
where the stock becomes infected with a contagious disease
through its fault. The carrier must protect from exposure to
contagious and infectious disease, shipments of live stock while
29 Kinnick v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 69 Iowa 665.
30 St. Louis & Southeastern Ry. Co. v. Dorman, 72 111. 504.
31 106 111. App. 563.
32 Coupland v. Housatonic R. Co., 61 Conn. 531; Betts v. Chicago,
R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 92 Iowa 343.
33 Illinois Central R. Co. v. Harris, 184 Ill. 57; Lake Erie & W. R. Co.
v. Holland, 162 Ind. 406.
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transporting them.3 4 It is the duty of the carrier to furnish cars
which are not infected with any contagious disease. If failure
in this duty results in contraction of a disease by the live stock,
the carrier is liable for such damages as have been sustained.
3 5
The liability of a railroad company in negligently furnishing
an infected car for the transportation of live stock is recognized
in St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railroad Co. v. Hender-
son.3 6 A verdict for the plaintiff in that action was reversed
because evidence was presented to show that the cattle were
exposed to infection outside the car. The liability of a carrier
for negligence in furnishing infected pens for the reception
of cattle previous to shipment is impliedly recognized in Texas
& Pacific Railway Co. v. Beal & Self.
3 7
A carrier must also protect stock from exposure to infectious
diseases during transportation. Hence, where a carrier negli-
gently exposes a shipment of hogs to hog cholera by switching
them through a zone in which hogs are so infected, it is liable
for losses occasioned by the disease contracted from such
exposure.
3 8
The carrier is not liable for injury to livestock from sickness
caused by severe storms-where it has done all that it could to
prevent injury-since the proximate cause is an act of God.
3 9
So, also, where the death of an animal which is being transported
is caused by an attack of meningitis, the carrier is not liable
where it does all in its power to protect the animal after such
an attack.4 0 Nor is a carrier liable for the loss of live stock
through sickness where it does not appear that such sickness was
caused by its negligence.
41
A carrier cannot be held liable merely because some cattle
carried by it die or are sick from a contagious disease several
days after they are delivered, unless it is shown that the carrier
was responsible for their contracting the disease. 42
34 Illinois Central R. Co. v. Harris, 184 11. 57; Baltimore & 0. R.
Co. v. Dever, 112 Md. 296.
35 Illinois Central R. Co. v. Harris, 184 Ill. 57; Baltimore & 0. R.
Co. v. Dever, 112 Md. 296.
36 57 Ark. 402.
37 43 Tex. Civ. App. 588.
88 Council v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 123 Mo. App. 432.
39 Herring v. Chesapeake & W. R. Co., 101 Va. 778.
40 Klair v. Wilmington S. Co., 4 Penn. (Del.) 51; St. Louis & S. F. R.
Co. v. Brosuis, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 647.
41 Schoenfeld v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 49 La. Ann. 907.
42 Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Dever, 112 Md. 296.
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The law in Illinois is well established by the case of Illinois
Central Railroad Company v. Harris.43 Here, the plaintiff shipped
some cattle from Centralia to Seymore over the defendant's
road. Shortly after their arrival they became sick with Texas
fever, and some died. It was shown by evidence that the cattle
shipped were all native; that Texas fever had never existed in
the territory where they were raised, and that they had never
been exposed to it before the date of their shipment. No Texas
fever had existed within twenty-five years either in the vicinity
of shipment or destination. It was also proved that the cars
had been used recently by the company in carrying other cattle.
The conclusion to be drawn is that the cattle must necessarily
have contracted the disease in the cars from germs which had
been left in the cars from recent shipments. The court said:
"A duty rested upoa the defendant to furnish plaintiff ears
not infected with disease, and a failure in that regard would
render it liable for the loss sustained thereby. . . . It was
the duty of the defendant to furnish reasonably safe cars in
which the cattle might be transported, and it was also the duty
of the defendant to furnish cars which were not infected with
any contagious cattle disease, and if defendant failed to dis-
charge its duty and appellee was injured in consequence of such
failure, then plaintiff was entitled to recover such damages as
he may have sustained."
Thus, it is seen that it is the duty of a carrier of live stock
to furnish cars which are not infected with any contagious
disease and that failure to discharge such duty renders the car-
rier liable for resulting damages.
EFFECT OF FRAUD IN OVERVALUATION IN FIRE INSURANCE
POLIcY.-A fire insurance company in issuing a policy of insur-
ance on personal property undertakes to assume the risk
described in the policy and based upon the valuation of the
property as there stated, and if the property actually insured
is of a different value from that stated in the policy it has
assumed a different risk from that intended. An intentional
misrepresentation of value would be a fraud upon the insurer.
Several items may, however, be insured in the same contract,
and an overvaluation may have been placed by the insured only
on one item. What effect does this have upon the contract as
a whole?
This question was considered in the recent case of Moreau
v. Palatine Insurance Company of London, England.44 In that
43 184 Ill. 57.
44 (N. H.) 151 Atlantic 817.
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action, one of assumpsit on a fire insurance policy, the facts,
briefly, were these: The plaintiff had insured his house, barn,
and some personal property. In the proof of loss the defen-
dants contended there had been an intentional and fraudulent
overvaluation which avoided the contract. The defendant in-
surance company contended further that since the contract pro-
vided that such fraud would void the whole policy, the plaintiff
could not even recover for his real property loss, even though
the overvaluation related only to the personalty. And the court
sustained this contention.
Before considering the reasoning of the court, it is perhaps
pertinent to consider some relative matters, among them 'value"
as used in insurance policies. In Phoenix Insurance Company
v. Pickel,45 the court discusses value and cites Wood on Insur-
ance to this effect:
"How is value to be determined? Is it not a matter of
judgment and opinion wholly, except, it may be, in special
instances? How is the value of real estate to be estimated?
What is the standard by which to ascertain the value of a
building? Is it what this man or that says it is worth? Is it
what it would cost to build another of the same style and mate-
rial? The ascertainment of any of these facts is a mere matter
of judgment. Has not the assured the same right to exercise
his judgment if he exercises it honestly that his neighbors on
the jury have? When the insurers propound this inquiry, upon
what basis and by what standard is it to be presumed they
expect the insured to estimate the value? Is it reasonable to
suppose that they expect him to estimate the value of the mate-
rials composing it, the cost of labor to build it, or rather, to
give his honest judgment and opinion upon the question? Sup-
pose the question in the application to be: 'What in your honest
judgment and opinion, is the value of the property?' Would
it not be held that in order to avoid the policy, the insurer
must show that the value was not given according to the honest
judgment and opinion of the insured? Most certainly. And
it is difficult to conceive how the introduction of the words
'judgment or opinion' into the question can affect the rights
of the parties at all, for in nearly all instances the question
of value is well known to be mere matter of opinion. Particu-
larly is this so as to buildings and real estate generally, and
all the insurer expects or has the right to expect in answer to a
question of the value thereof, is simply the honest judgment and
opinion of the assured; and it is absurd to hold the assured
45 119 Ind. 155.
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responsible for an error of judgment honestly made, simply
because his neighbors differ with him in that respect. A doctrine
that held the insurer up to a strictly exact valuation would be
extremely unjust, and would result in vitiating one-half the
policies issued, for, under the rule, the difference of one cent
is as disastrous as a difference of a large amount."
What is true of valuation in the application is equally true
of valuation in proof of loss. A study of the cases shows it is
almost axiomatic that a policy is always void by the common law
for the least want of good faith in the assured. 46 The law is
that a person who has made a fraudulent claim should not be
permitted to recover.
47
Generally the condition against fraud or false swearing ap-
plies to all matters concerning the insurance, whether before
or after loss. However, such statements do not avoid the policy
unless they are knowingly false and fraudulent. Honest mis-
takes, though negligently made, do not violate the condition.
If the insured resorts to false or fraudulent conduct to induce
making of a contract where none would otherwise be entered
into, it is sufficient to avoid the insurance without stipulation to
that effect.
48
In the standard policy, the clause which makes the contract
void "in case of any fraud or false swearing by the insured
touching any matter relating to this insurance or the subject
thereof, whether before or after loss" extends this rule to all
statements made by the insured with reference to the insurance
either before the loss or after it.49 Such a condition is held to be
reasonable and valid. It is intended to give the insurer a remedy
against false and fraudulent claims that may be made about
the value of property lost or damaged, and it is especially
aimed at falsehood and fraud in the statements required to be
made in connection with notice and proofs of loss.
However, no legal inference of intentional fraud can be de-
rived from the mere fact that the insured overstates the value. 50
To constitute fraud or false swearing which will work a forfei-
ture of insurance there must be, it was decided in Natiomal Fire
Insurance Company v. Itasca Lumber Company,51 a false state-
46 Ferris v. North American Fire Insurance Co., 1 Hill. 71.
47 Harris v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 35 Conn. 310.
48 Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance. pp. 689-94.
49 Moore v. Virginia Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 69 Va. 508.
5o Merchants & Mechanics Ins. Co. v. Schroeder, 18 Ill. App. 216;
Lynchburg Fire Ins. Co. v. West, 76 Va. 575; Behrens v. Germania
Fire Ins. Co., 64 Iowa 19; Phoenix insurance Co. v. Moog, 78 Ala. 284.
51 148 Minn. 170.
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ment wilfully made regarding a material matter with the inten-
tion of thereby deceiving the insurers.
George J. Couch in his comprehensive work on insurance
52
points out that a policy will be vitiated by the suppression of
known material facts by the insured though withheld uninten-
tionally or by mistake or inadvertence without actual fraud.
If a material fact is concealed, intentionally or not, the policy
is void.
What then is the fraud which will vitiate a policy? "Where
fraud is alleged against an insured, if the insurers wish to
repudiate liability on this ground, it is necessary for them to
obtain proof of the existence of the fraud sufficient to sustain
the charge before a jury. The distinction must, however, be
noted between a false representation honestly believed to be
true and one known to be false. Where overvaluation is so
palpable as to exclude the plea of misjudgment, there would be
no question as to the intention to defraud.
' '53
It thus appears that mere mistakes in stating facts which do
not in themselves annul the policy's conditions and do not
appear to be wilful misrepresentations will not defeat an action
to recover on an insurance contract. In the case of Commercial
Insurance Company of California v. Friedlander,54 in which
it was decided that "mere overvaluation of the property de-
stroyed honestly made without intent to deceive in proofs of loss
will not defeat a recovery on a policy which declares that fraud
or overvaluation or misrepresentation shall avoid it, and that
proofs of loss shall state the actual cash value of the property.
An appraisal of the value of property not destroyed by a person
selected for that purpose is not conclusive of the amount of loss,
so as to preclude proof of the quantity, quality, and value of the
property insured."
Even an attempt to defraud is generally considered sufficient
to avoid the policy. This was decided in a case where the policy
provided that "the policy shall be void if the insured has made
any attempt to defraud the company either before or after the
loss." The contract was held to be plain and unambiguous and
the insured's effort to recover ten thousand dollars on the policy
was frustrated by the evidence, which, although not uncontra-
dicted showed plainly an effort to overstate, with knowledge,
the value of the property. 5
52Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, sec. 781.
531Remington, Dictionary of Fire Insurance.
54 156 Ill. 595.
55 Columbia Insurance Co. of Indiana v. Modern Laundry, 277 Fed.
855.
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Where the mistake of the insured was due to his ignorance
of the English language and the statement which is considered
offensive was made under the direction of the person who aided
him in making the proofs, and it appeared it was not made by
the assured wilfully or with any intent to defraud the company,
there was held to be no forfeiture. 511 Again, innocent misstate-
ments of interest, such as that another had an interest in the
property whereas no such interest existed, do not constitute
fraud or false swearing sufficient to avoid liability on the policy,
especially where the statutes provide that intent to deceive is
an essential element of false swearing in proofs of loss. 57 In
another Federal case,58 it was decided that where the policy
stipulated that fraud or false swearing by the assured should
work forfeiture of all claims under them, statements in the
proofs of loss, honestly made, although subsequently discovered
to be mistaken, would not work a forfeiture.
Whether the intention to deceive will be implied in law is
clearly answered in Claflin v. Commonwealth Insurance Com-
pany,59 a leading case, where the court held that "a false answer
as to any matter of fact material to the inquiry knowingly and
wilfully made with intent to deceive the insurer would be fraud-
ulent. If it accomplished its result it would be a fraud effected;
if it failed it would be a fraud attempted. And if the matter
were material and the statement false, to the knowledge of the
party making it, and wilfully made, the intention to deceive the
insurer would be necessarily implied for the law presumes every
man to intend the natural consequences of his act."
As a general rule, statements made in proofs of loss are not
conclusive upon the claimant provided they are made in good
faith and without intent or attempt to defraud the insurer.6O
From this it follows that mere mistakes and bona fide errors
therein may be corrected, unless the insurer has acted upon the
proofs in such a manner that to permit correction would be in-
equitable. Where a statement in the proofs is substantially
correct, inclusion of one item by mistake is of no consequence.
The well-established rule is that in making proofs of loss a
mere overvaluation of the property made through mistake or
inadvertance does not constitute false swearing or fraud, if it
represents the honest opinion, estimate or belief of the insured. 61
56 Dogge v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 49 Wis. 501.
57 Alliance Ins. Co. v. Enders, 293 Fed. 485.
58 Republic Ins. Co. v. Weides, 14 Wall. 375.
59 110 U. S. 81.
60 Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, sec. 1586.
61 Commercial Ins. Co. v. Friedlander, 156 Ill. 595.
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Where the value of the property destroyed is largely in excess
of the insurance so that an exaggeration cannot operate to
defraud or injure the insurer, an overvaluation if honestly made
will not avoid the policy. But, any attempt to collect on a
fictitious overvaluation works forfeiture.
A mistake as to the name of the owner of the property, the
cause of a fire, the incumbrance when the owner does not deem
it a lien, whether there is other insurance, the amount of the
insurance on the property, whether fire or smoke or water caused
the damage-would have no effect on the validity of the fire
insurance policy and the right of the insured to collect under
this contract.
As to whether or not there has been sufficient fraud to avoid
the policy is a matter for the jury to decide. Ordinarily, when
"it appears from the evidence that there was an overestimate
of value it is a question of fact for the jury to determine whether
the insured acted honestly and in good faith in making such
valuation or whether there was an intention on his part to
defraud the insurer.' ' 2 But this is not always the case, as,
for instance, where the disparity between the value as given
and the actual value is so great as plainly to evince intent to
defraud. Here, the question of false swearing becomes one of
law for the court and not one of fact for the jury. In fact, a
verdict should be directed for the defendant insurance company
in any case where the evidence clearly establishes fraud or
false swearing.
Overvaluation of property by the insured may take place
either at the time of making the contract or at the time of sub-
mitting proofs of loss. In either event, under the standard
policy conditions, such overvaluation if fraudulent entirely
voids the insurance. 63 The mere fact of overvaluation, even
though it be great, is not alone sufficient proof of fraud. It
must be alleged and clearly proved by the insurer that the
insured in overvaluing his property did so knowingly and with
fraudulent intent.
In the case of Commercial Cabinet Company v. North British
& Marine Insurance Company,64 the court declared that "the
mere fact that an assured in the proofs of loss has made an over-
valuation of property destroyed is insufficient to establish that
the assured was guilty of fraud or false swearing rendering
62 Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, sec. 1557.
63 Moore v. Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 69 Va. 508; Phoenix Ins.
Co. v. Pickel, 119 Ind. 155; Baker v. State Ins. Co., 31 Or. 41; Titus
v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 410.
64 220 Ill. App. 453.
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policies of insurance void under their terms, where the values
mentioned in the proofs represent the honest opinion, estimate
or belief of the assured."
It is important to notice here that for a false statement of
value at the time of making the contract to avoid the insurance,
such statement must have been made with the fraudulent intent
to injure the insurer.", No such specific intent is necessary,
however, in order that a consciously false statement in connec-
tion with the proof of loss will avoid the insurance.
In Pottle v. Liverpool and London and Globe Insurance Corn-
pany,66 it was held that "it is a firmly established legal doctrine
that if a plaintiff in an action on a policy of fire insurance falsely
and knowingly inserts in his sworn proof of loss such a false and
excessive valuation on single articles or on the whole property
as displays a reckless disregard of truth, he cannot recover."
From the cases considered, the answer is given to the question
brought forth in the case of Moreau v. Palatine Insurance Com-
pany of London, England:6 7 If the policy covers both realty
and personalty, or various items of either, will fraud in the
proofs of loss of any one void the whole policy? The obvious
answer is, "it will," for such fraud goes to the very root of the
contract.
In Moore v. Virginia Insurance Company,65 where the fire
policy provided that all fraud or attempted fraud or false swear-
ing on the part of insured should forfeit all claims under the
policy, the insured was covered for two thousand dollars on
building, one thousand dollars on machinery and fixtures, and
two thousand dollars on a stock of grain and incidentals. A
loss occurred, and the insured in his sworn proofs made a
false and fraudulent statement as to the stock of grain, but not
as to the other subjects of insurance. It was held the entire
policy was forfeited. This same view is taken by the court in
Dolloff v. Phoenix Insurance Company,69 where it was said that
"fraud in any part or as to any items of a formal statement
of loss taints the whole and operates to defeat a recovery upon
any part of the policy, it having been said that thus corrupted,
it should be wholly rejected and the suitor left to repent that
he has destroyed his actual claim by his false swearing."
65 Home Ins. Co. v. Mendenhall, 164 Ill. 458.
66 108 Me. 301. See also Kavooras v. Insurance Co. of Illinois, 167
Ill. App. 220.
67 (N. H.) 151 At. 817.
68 69 Va. 508.
69 82 Me. 266.
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Where the false swearing clause provides for the avoidance
of the entire policy or "all claims" thereunder, false swearing
as to any articles covered will avoid it even though the different
articles are severally valued and insured."0
The rule is followed in the Illinois case of Ledford v. Hartford
Fire Insurance Company.7 1  There it was held: "Where a
policy contains a stipulation to the effect that it shall be void
in case of any fraud or false swearing by the insured touching
any matter relating to the insurance, whether before or after
loss, a false statement under oath lnowingly and purposely made
by the assured for the purpose of procuring falsely excessive
valuation of the property lost, causes a forfeiture of all claims
under the policy and prevents a recovery thereunder."
In the Moreau case,7 2 which involved a fraudulent overvalua-
tion in the proof of losg concerning the personalty, the court
declared the whole policy void, including the coverage for the
realty, and refused to recognize the contention of the plaintiff
that the policy is divisible. The court said: "The issue is one
of construction of the policy. In its wording no intimation of
such a divisional theory is suggested. There is no semblance of
an indication of a combination of a number of policies, at least
in respect to fraud. . . . Whatever the rule when the
breach of condition is not fraud, there appears to be but little
dissent from holding the entire policy void when the breach is
fraud."
The result of the study of the cases, then, makes certain
essentials stand out. First, the contract of insurance, in its
standard form, provides that the policy shall be void for fraud
in the application or proofs of loss. Second, the proof of fraud
in the application must be more strictly presented than that
in the loss statement. Third, an honest mistake will not avoid
a policy, and it is a matter for the jury to determine whether
an overvaluation, misstatement of fact, or error was made with
or without the intention to defraud. Fourth, the policy of insur-
ance is a unit, and all matters covered by it are effected by the
fraud clause so that fraud as to one of the items vitiates the
whole contract.
70Alfred Hiller Company v. Insurance Company of North America,
125 La. 938.
71 161 Ill. App. 233.
72 Moreau v. Palatine Ins. Co., (N. H.) 151 Atl. 817.
